Faculty Directory
Jason D. Hartline

Professor of Computer Science

Contact

2233 Tech Drive
Mudd Room 3015
Evanston, IL 60208-3109

847-467-0280Email Jason Hartline

Website

Jason Hartline's Homepage

Theory Group

Economics Group


Departments

Computer Science


Download CV

Education

Ph.D. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

M.S. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

B.S. Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

B.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY


Research Interests

Prof. Hartline's research introduces design and analysis methodologies

from computer science to understand and improve outcomes of economic

systems. Optimal behavior and outcomes in complex environments are

complex and, therefore, should not be expected; instead, the theory of

approximation can show that simple and natural behaviors are

approximately optimal in complex environments. This approach is

applied to auction theory and mechanism design in his graduate

textbook Mechanism Design and Approximation

(http://www.jasonhartline.com/MDnA/) which is under preparation.


Selected Publications

  • Feng, Yiding; Hartline, Jason D.; Li, Yingkai, Revelation gap for pricing from samples, Association for Computing Machinery:1438-1451.
  • Hartline, Jason; Johnsen, Aleck; Li, Yingkai, Benchmark design and prior-independent optimization, IEEE Computer Society:294-305.
  • Camara, Modibo K.; Hartline, Jason D.; Johnsen, Aleck, Mechanisms for a no-regret agent, IEEE Computer Society:259-270.
  • Dughmi, Shaddin; Hartline, Jason; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Niazadeh, Rad, Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design, Journal of the ACM 68(2).
  • Alaei, Saeed; Fu, Hu; Haghpanah, Nima; Hartline, Jason D; Malekian, Azarakhsh, Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(3):1058-1086.
  • Hartline, Jason D; Johnsen, Aleck; Nekipelov, Denis; Zoeter, Onno, Dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces?, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc:591-592.
  • Hartline, Jason D; Taggart, Samuel, Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms?, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc:399-416.
  • Feng, Yiding; Hartline, Jason D, An end-to-end argument in mechanism design (Prior-independent auctions for budgeted agents), IEEE Computer Society:404-415.
  • Dughmi, Shaddin; Hartline, Jason D; Kleinberg, Robert; Niazadeh, Rad, Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design, Association for Computing Machinery:158-169.
  • Alaei, Saeed; Hartline, Jason D; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang, Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing, IEEE Computer Society:1446-1463.
  • Hartline, Jason D; Lucier, Brendan, Non-optimal mechanism design, American Economic Review 105(10):3102-3124.