Faculty Directory
Jason D. Hartline

Professor of Computer Science

Contact

2233 Tech Drive
Mudd Room 3015
Evanston, IL 60208-3109

847-467-0280Email Jason Hartline

Website

Jason Hartline's Homepage

Theory Group

Economics Group


Departments

Computer Science


Download CV

Education

Ph.D. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

M.S. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

B.S. Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

B.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY


Research Interests

Prof. Hartline's research introduces design and analysis methodologies
from computer science to understand and improve outcomes of economic
systems.  Optimal behavior and outcomes in complex environments are
complex and, therefore, should not be expected; instead, the theory of
approximation can show that simple and natural behaviors are
approximately optimal in complex environments.  This approach is
applied to auction theory and mechanism design in his graduate
textbook Mechanism Design and Approximation
(http://www.jasonhartline.com/MDnA/) which is under preparation.


Selected Publications

  • Hartline, Jason D; Johnsen, Aleck; Nekipelov, Denis; Zoeter, Onno, Dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces?, ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
  • Hartline, Jason D; Taggart, Samuel, Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms?, ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
  • Feng, Yiding; Hartline, Jason D, An end-to-end argument in mechanism design (Prior-independent auctions for budgeted agents), Proceedings - 59th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2018
  • Dughmi, Shaddin; Hartline, Jason D; Kleinberg, Robert; Niazadeh, Rad, Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design, STOC 2017 - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
  • Alaei, Saeed; Hartline, Jason D; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang, Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing, Proceedings - 2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2015
  • Hartline, Jason D; Lucier, Brendan, Non-optimal mechanism design, American Economic Review