Faculty Directory
Jason D. Hartline

Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Contact

2145 Sheridan Road
Tech
Evanston, IL 60208-3109

Email Jason Hartline

Website

Theory Group

Economics Group

Jason Hartline's Homepage


Departments

Electrical Engineering and Computer Science


Download CV

Education

Ph.D. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

M.S. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

B.S. Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

B.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY


Research Interests

Prof. Hartline's research introduces design and analysis methodologies
from computer science to understand and improve outcomes of economic
systems.  Optimal behavior and outcomes in complex environments are
complex and, therefore, should not be expected; instead, the theory of
approximation can show that simple and natural behaviors are
approximately optimal in complex environments.  This approach is
applied to auction theory and mechanism design in his graduate
textbook Mechanism Design and Approximation
(http://www.jasonhartline.com/MDnA/) which is under preparation.


Selected Publications

  • Chawla, Shuchi; Hartline, Jason; Nekipelov, Denis, “Mechanism design for data science”, EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2014)
  • Hartline, Jason; Fu, Hu; Haghpanah, Nima; Kleinberg, Robert, “Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling”, EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2014)
  • Hartline, Jason; Hoy, Darrell; Taggart, Sam, “Price of anarchy for auction revenue”, EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2014)
  • Hartline, Jason; Fu, Hu; Haghpanah, Nima; Alaei, Saeed, “The simple economics of approximately optimal auctions”, Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS, (2013)
  • Chawla, Shuchi; Hartline, Jason D., “Auctions with unique equilibria”, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, (2013)
  • Hartline, Jason D.; Devanur, Nikhil R.; Ha, Bach Q., “Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents”, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, (2013)
  • Fu, Hu; Hartline, Jason; Hoy, Darrell, “Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents”, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, (2013)
  • Chawla, Shuchi; Hartline, Jason D.; Malec, David; Sivan, Balasubramanian, “Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling”, Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, (2013)